

Approved For Release 2009/08/28 : CIA-RDP86B00420R000901820001-1
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Meeting with Secretary Weinberger

27 April 1984



Please return to:
SA/DCI/IA

26 April 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: SA/DCI/IA
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Secretary Weinberger and
Deputy Secretary Taft, 27 April 1984

1. You are scheduled to have breakfast with Secretary Weinberger and Deputy Secretary Taft tomorrow morning, here at the Agency. DoD has suggested only one item for tomorrow's agenda. This concerns:

-- A Joint CIA/DIA Response to the Long Commission Recommendations. The Secretary intends to raise this subject with you so as to be sure that both you and he have a common understanding of the agreed upon approach. At TAB A is a memo that Ambassador Isham has prepared that outlines the actions agreed to by the Senior Review Group.

2. No items have been suggested by our people for tomorrow's meeting. Nonetheless, you may wish to raise the following two issues:

-- Berlin Air Corridor Restrictions. At TAB B are talking points prepared by [redacted] for your use. George is concerned that the US lacks a strategy for dealing with recent, unilaterally imposed Soviet restrictions on the Berlin Air Corridors. Although we have protested such restrictions, the Soviets nonetheless keep imposing them and we have no plan for dealing with the Soviet tactic of "sweet talk and tenacity" on the issue. Your talking points allow you to express concern about this pattern, and to suggest that any strategy for dealing with this problem should include [redacted]
[redacted] a negotiating package intended to meet both Allied and Soviet concerns. Also at this TAB are background notes, a map, and relevant cables.

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3. If there is anything else I can do to help prepare for this meeting, please call.

cc: EA/DDCI



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Attachment #1

TALKING POINTS FOR DCI MEETING WITH WEINBERGER

BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR RESERVATIONS

- I am concerned about the lack of a comprehensive U.S. strategy to deal with the unilateral reservations the Soviets are imposing in the Berlin air corridors.
- These reservations not only contravene the normal way of doing business in the Berlin Air Safety Center but force aircraft to adopt undesirable landing patterns.
- So far our protests to the Soviets have produced much sweet talk but have not deterred the Soviets from imposing new reservations whenever they wish.
- I think we need to initiate rapid action to develop a comprehensive strategy for countering the Soviet actions. The strategy should include [redacted] 25X1
- [redacted] 25X1 a negotiating package intended to meet both Allied and Soviet concerns.

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #02397-84
18 April 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

25X1 FROM: [redacted]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT: Recommended Discussion Item for Meeting with Mr. McFarlane

1. Recommendation: Despite Western protests and Soviet avowals that they do not intend to change the rules in the Berlin air corridors, the Soviets continue unilaterally to impose restrictions and the West has not yet developed a strategy -- beyond continued talking with the Soviets -- to deal with the situation. I recommend that you discuss this matter with Mr. McFarlane during your regular meeting with him. Suggested talking points are provided as Attachment #1.

2. Background:

- Air access to Berlin is governed by a post-war agreement that established the three corridors;
- In the early 60's the Soviets unilaterally imposed a 10,000 foot flight ceiling in the corridors. The Allies rejected the ceiling in principle but accepted it in practice.
- In the fall of 1979 the Soviets began imposing minimum altitudes (usually around 5,000 feet) over some training areas. Despite Allied apprehension over the precedent a modus vivendi was developed for the sake of flight safety and the West accepted the Soviet restrictions.

[redacted]

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BACKGROUND


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- On 20 February of this year the Soviets began periodically imposing minimum flight levels for the entire length of one or more corridors. The Soviets claimed that their intent was to ensure flight safety. But these reservations forced flights going into Berlin to use an undesirable landing pattern, as can be seen in the graphic that constitutes Attachment #2.
- Although objecting that the Soviets had no right to impose such reservations, the Allies have obeyed them in practice. They have continued to protest the Soviet reservations at various levels.

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-- On 16 and 17 April the Soviets once again imposed reservations.

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3. Current Situation: In sum, we keep protesting the reservations, the Soviets keep imposing them, and we have no plan for dealing with their tactic of sweet talk and tenacity on the issue. As you know, we are examining the possibility that the Soviet air reservations constitute but a larger pattern of activity, (bigger military exercises and the possible escalation in Afghanistan, etc.) designed to intimidate the U.S. But action on Berlin cannot await the completion of that examination. The longer the situation is allowed to develop as it has so far, the harder it will be to reestablish acceptable flight rules. I recommend that the USG rapidly develop a new approach

a negotiating package of trade-offs intended to meet both allied and Soviet concerns.

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Attachments: As stated


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Berlin Air Corridor Altitude Restrictions



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